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Are	Sino-US	relations	really	comparable	to	the	WWI-
era	Anglo-German	rivalry?
Imperial	Germany’s	rivalry	with	Britain	is	often	used	as	an	analogy	to	explain	the	contemporary	US-
China	relationship.	Kate	Epstein	explains	why	this	interpretation	of	the	past	is	based	on	an	outdated
draft	of	history,	and	what	new	questions	might	be	asked	based	on	more	recent	research.
One	of	today’s	premier	strategic	challenges	is	the	Sino-US	relationship.	When	analysts	turn	to	history
seeking	perspective	on	navigating	this	challenge,	the	analogy	most	often	employed	is	the	Anglo-
German	relationship	before	the	First	World	War.	Like	Germany	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	the	logic	runs,	China	is	now
a	rising	economic	and	naval	power	challenging	the	declining	global	economic	and	naval	hegemon—Great	Britain
then,	the	United	States	now.	Just	as	Britain	had	to	abandon	global	reach	in	order	to	concentrate	on	the	emerging
threat	across	the	North	Sea,	so	the	United	States	must	now	pivot	to	the	Pacific.
However,	the	scholarship	on	which	contemporary	analysts	tend	to	rely	for	their	understanding	of	the	historical	side	of
the	analogy	is	dated.	When	their	footnotes	are	scrutinized,	the	road	typically	leads	through	Paul	Kennedy’s	work
back	to	that	of	Arthur	Marder,	an	American	historian	whose	path-breaking	books	on	the	pre-war	Royal	Navy,
published	in	1940	and	1961,	established	key	elements	of	the	conventional	narrative	of	British	naval	and	strategic
policy	during	this	period.	These	included	the	primacy	of	the	German	threat;	the	centrality	of	the	“dreadnought
revolution”	and	the	Anglo-German	“arms	race”;	and	the	abandonment	of	imperial	defense	in	order	to	concentrate
forces	in	home	waters.
There	is	no	doubting	that	Marder’s	work	was	seminal.	But	his	research	was	far	more	limited	than	is	generally
realized.	On	a	crucial	research	trip	to	the	Admiralty	Record	Office	in	1938,	when	he	gathered	the	evidence	that
informed	his	understanding	of	the	pre-war	era	in	all	his	subsequent	work,	his	time	was	limited	to	four	weeks,	he	was
not	given	the	freedom	to	consult	any	records	he	wished,	and	he	was	obliged	to	use	vague	citations.	As	a	result,	his
work	fails	to	meet	three	basic	conditions	for	sound	scholarship:	sufficient	time	in	key	archives,	intellectual	freedom	to
ask	questions	and	follow	the	evidence	where	it	leads,	and	accurate	footnoting.
Beginning	in	the	1970s,	a	new	draft	of	pre-war	British	naval	history	began	to	be	developed	which	does	meet	these
conditions.	Since	then,	two	historians—Jon	Sumida	and	Nicholas	Lambert—have	produced	a	body	of	scholarship
that	rests	on	a	far	broader	and	deeper	evidentiary	base	than	Marder’s.	In	addition	to	their	unparalleled	command	of
the	Admiralty	records,	they	have	undertaken	extensive	research	in	non-naval	archives.	The	quantitative	and
qualitative	gap	between	their	research	and	Marder’s	is	so	great	that	any	attempt	to	reconcile	their	work	with	Marder’s
into	a	“post-revisionist”	synthesis	betrays	a	misunderstanding	of	the	nature	of	the	literature.	Thus,	it	would	be	a
mistake	to	think	of	them	as	offering	a	“revisionist”	take	on	Marder’s	“orthodox”	version.
The	interpretation	of	pre-war	British	naval	and	strategic	history	developed	by	Sumida	and	Lambert	differs
fundamentally	from	Marder’s.	Not	only	do	the	former	treat	the	technical	aspects	of	the	subject	with	greater	precision
than	the	latter,	they	also	place	it	in	broader	context.	Where	Marder	emphasized	battleship	construction	and
operational	redeployment	as	the	centerpieces	of	naval	policy,	Sumida	and	Lambert	lay	greater	stress	on	state
finances,	domestic	politics,	public-private	partnerships,	and	the	character	of	the	global	economic	system.
From	this	loftier	vantage	point,	Sumida	and	Lambert	find	that	the	Admiralty	did	not	give	up	on	imperial	defense	to
concentrate	on	the	North	Sea,	but	rather	that	it	remained	committed	to	global	reach.	While	the	Admiralty	certainly
regarded	Germany	as	an	emerging	threat,	it	continued	to	see	France	and	Russia	as	equal	or	greater	threats	for
longer	than	Marder	allowed.	Lambert	in	particular	shows	how	the	Admiralty	believed	it	could	maintain	Britain’s
relative	power	by	leveraging	continued	British	dominance—undiminished	by	industrialization—over	the	infrastructure
of	the	global	trading	system.	Together,	Sumida	and	Lambert	show	that	while	Britain	was	a	declining	power	in	certain
respects,	its	global	hegemony	remained	uncontested	in	others.
There	are	two	takeaway	points	here.	The	first	is	that	if	analysts	want	to	consult	history	for	perspectives	on	current
events,	they	need	to	pay	attention	to	the	scholarly	quality	of	the	processes	used	by	historians	to	reach	their
conclusions—not	simply	to	the	rhetorical	usefulness	of	the	conclusions.	What	historians	say	matters	little	if	how	they
come	to	say	it	is	fundamentally	flawed.	Put	crudely,	what	is	the	intellectual	utility	of	erroneous	history?
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The	second	takeaway	point	is	that	changes	to	the	back	half	of	a	historical	analogy	should	lead	to	changes	in	the	front
half.	If	the	understanding	of	the	Anglo-German	relationship	on	which	the	analogy	to	the	Sino-US	relationship	is	based
rests	on	an	outdated	draft	of	history,	what	new	questions	about	the	Sino-US	relationship	might	be	asked	based	on
the	best	current	draft	of	history?	For	starters,	perhaps	contemporary	analysts	should	be	thinking	not	only	in	terms	of
US	decline	but	also	in	terms	of	how	the	United	States	can	leverage	its	continuing	strengths.	In	addition,	they	might
think	less	in	purely	military	terms	and	more	in	terms	of	domestic	politics	(would	the	homefront	remain	unified	in	a	war
with	China	or	splinter	into	interest	groups?),	budgets	(what	will	Americans	realistically	support	relative	to	other	fiscal
priorities?),	and	the	structure	of	the	global	economic	system	(what	will	happen	to	US	factories,	to	say	nothing	of
neutrals’	factories,	which	rely	on	global	supply	chains	when	the	global	economy	is	deranged—as	it	would	be	in	a	US
war	with	China?).
Like	any	body	of	scholarship,	the	best	available	draft	of	pre-war	British	naval	and	strategic	history	cannot	answer
these	questions.	And	time	alone	will	tell	whether	Sumida	and	Lambert	are	correct.	But	they	have	provided	more	than
enough	evidence	to	show	that	Marder’s	interpretation	cannot	be	correct.	For	any	analyst	or	policymaker	hoping	to
gain	perspective	from	studying	the	past,	their	draft	offers	a	better	starting	point	than	the	draft	currently	in	use.
_________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	International	Affairs.
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